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THE DARK SIDE
OF TOWN

THE SOCIAL CAPITAL REVOLUTION
IN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY LAW

published in Virginia Law Review, volume 99
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Stephanie M. Stern
Associate Professor of Law

BA, Brown University
JD, Yale Law School

S

tephanie M. Stern’s research focuses on applications of social and cognitive psychology
to legal regimes of property ownership, land use, and environmental law. Her recent
articles have appeared in the Michigan Law Review, Columbia Law Review, Cornell Law
Review, Virginia Law Review, and Minnesota Law Review, and have been reprinted and
discussed in several books.
Professor Stern joined the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty in 2009 and teaches in the areas
of land use, environmental law, property, and commercial real estate transactions. Professor Stern was previously an assistant professor at Loyola University Chicago School of
Law and a Bigelow Teaching Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School. From 2001
to 2003, she was an associate at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, focusing on property and environmental litigation.
Following law school, Professor Stern clerked for Judge Kermit Lipez of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and served as a research fellow at the Yale Center
for Law and Environmental Policy.
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/sstern
www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/sstern.
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The Dark Side of Town
The Social Capital Revolution
in Residential Property Law
BY STEPHANIE M. STERN

I

n the past decade, there has been a remarkable
ascendance of social capital theory in property policy
and scholarship, a trend that has not been examined
to date. Scholars and policymakers have advocated laws
and property arrangements to promote social capital
and relied on social capital to devolve property governance from legal institutions to resident groups.
My article, The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital
Revolution in Residential Property Law, examines the
prevailing legal view of social capital’s salutary effects
for local property law. In this paper, I present a more
skeptical account of the dark side of residential social
capital and its capacity to effectuate local factions, promote inegalitarianism, and close off property.
Social capital is an influential theory of the value of
participation in associations and organizations, social
ties and networks, civic engagement and voting, trust,
and norms of reciprocity in economic and political
flourishing. In theory, social capital operates as a
group-level positive externality that promotes economic growth, better health and education outcomes,

A summary of Stephanie M. Stern, The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolution in Residential
Property Law, 99 Virginia Law Review 811 (2013).
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and, more tautologically, collective action capital, properly nourished, produces
and democratic participation. Local social positive externalities in an acceptably, if
capital is principally a theory of social co- not perfectly, egalitarian manner and dehesion, or bonding capital, and the capac- creases the need for legal institutions and
ity of residential groups to produce public the state.
goods without the guiding hand of state or
In the policy arena, social capital has
Keynesian intervention—a social science– had far-ranging influence in both local
infused theory of residential gemeinschaft. and federal government. In cities, as
While not blind to the potential ill effects
funds have dwindled following federal
and negative externalities of social capital, devolution to the states and shrinking
Putnam and other social capitalists none- state disbursements to localities, low cost,
theless advance social capital as a positive communitarian-style ventures that claim
public good and
to produce social
indicator of com- “The deep imprints of racial
capital have prolifmunity prosperity.
erated. Subsidies
segregation
and
land
cartels
on
My article
for social capital–
opens by examin- residential property illustrate
enhancing new
ing how the underurbanist residensocial
capital’s
pervasive
dark
specified and ential developments,
compassing nature side and call into question the community garof social capital
gatherings,
view of a social capital deficit dens,
makes it simultaneighborhood
neously attractive that law should remedy.”
block grants, and
and dangerous to
other efforts to
property policy and theory—part of the
socialize city residents now ostensibly furappeal of social capital is that it is cather social capital goals in an era of shrinkpacious enough to justify a breadth of
ing city funds for social services. Social
agendas. In the legal scholarship, property capital theory underlies recent experiments
scholars have become enthusiastic social
in neighborhood self-governance, such as the
capitalists, writing about how home mort- Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization
gage reform, land use law, homeownerProgram (NRP), which devolved local
ship, block-level governance and neighplanning and fiscal funding to neighborborhood governance, school finance, pro- hoods. Social capital is also a growing
cess restrictions on eminent domain, and
feature of centralized land use planning,
laws governing common interest commu- with some communities funding “Social
nities can promote, and capitalize upon,
Capital Assessments” to quantitatively
social capital. Property law can affirmameasure their community’s social captively build social capital by encouraging
ital and describing social capital stock
interpersonal interaction, mutual reliance, and goals in their comprehensive zoning
or residential tenure and stability. Someplans. At the federal level, the government
what circularly, in much legal scholarship justifies homeownership subsidies in part
social capital also fuels successful property on social capital goals, Hope VI public
institutions and enables devolution of
housing guidelines emphasize new urbangovernance and public and private goods
ist features claimed to enhance social
provision to resident groups. The unifying interaction and build social capital, and
strand of these narratives is that social
HUD has adopted the social capital–
[ 4 ] IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES

The Dark Side of Town

related theory of “defensible space.”

M

y article advances a skeptical view of
the benefits of local social capital in
property law. My critique of social capital
focuses on “bonding capital,” the more
ubiquitous and theoretically central form
of social capital. Such social capital is at
the core of effectuating, and sometimes
creating, local factions with interests
contrary to the public interest and rights
of other citizens that so concerned Madison. Networks, reciprocity, trust, tastes
for participation, and social ties facilitate
factional collusion to restrain residential
property supply and to act on preexisting preferences for illiberal exclusion.
Moreover, social capital can also create
or heighten such preferences as collective
action escalates individual commitments
and dense, reciprocal ties lock in bad
norms and stifle dissent.
In the first half of the article, I argue
that rather than diminishing the role of
law, abundant social capital may increase
the need for legal safeguards and, in some
cases, the desirability of formal institutions. The deep imprints of racial segregation and land cartels on residential property illustrate social capital’s pervasive
dark side and call into question the view
of a social capital deficit that law should
remedy. For example, considerable social
capital effectuated racial ouster in early to
mid-twentieth century “sundown towns”
across the United States that evicted
black residents and visitors through
threats, labor market exclusion, and violence. Today, social capital enables local
citizens to lobby for exclusionary zoning
laws that raise land prices by artificially
constricting supply and to enforce these
laws through citizen reports of violations
and protests against higher-density development.
The latter part of the article explores

how the enthusiasm for social capital
has obscured tradeoffs in the allocation
of property governance to residential
groups. Governing through social capital can deliver cost-savings and benefits
of local knowledge, but it may also directly empower factions, confine social
exchange, and increase the demand for
homogeneity. Devolving governance and
public goods provision to residents ratchets
up the importance of cooperation in the
face of inflated, but widely held, perceptions that those who are similar cooperate
best (in recent years, promoting social
capital has verged perilously close to engineering residential racial homogeneity).
Social capital–mediated governance may
also encourage illiberal internal distributions of property and governance roles
when class- and characteristic-based social status serves as a “quick and dirty”
allocation device to reduce the overwhelming coordination costs of collective
action.
Implicit in my account is a more skeptical assessment of the claimed benefits
of cohesive social capital to residential
communities. After almost three decades
of research, we know little about how to
promote or extract positive social capital through property law or residential
configurations—many attempts at social
capital engineering have been fumbling
and ill-fated. There is a sense, undoubtedly correct, that social ties, informal
cooperation, and altruism within parent
groups, congregations, extended families,
and other groups can have social value.
However, it is a leap from these voluntary,
organic examples of social capital, often
subject to thicker constraints or occurring
in areas where government non-involvement is pivotal to social or personal identity, to relying on social capital’s beneficial
effects to devolve property governance or
structure property law.
SPRING 2014 [ 5 ]
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I

n conclusion, in developed market
economies with established legal institutions, relying on social capital to
regulate residential property or sustain
community-governed property institutions may be a second-best solution, at
least in the absence of constraining laws
and supportive institutions. The recent
enthusiasm for social capital building and
informal micro-governance may be a step
backward to closed and private-minded
societies—what Ferdinand Tönnies described as gemeinschaft—that limit social
exchange and sacrifice social progress for
insularity. This is not to dismiss the work
of Elinor Ostrom, Bob Ellickson, or other
property and natural resource scholars
writing in the social capital tradition.
Rather, in The Dark Side of Town, I contend that devolution from law and formal institutions to self-governing groups
requires a fuller accounting, one that
includes social capital’s costs to residential life, property supply, liberalism, and
inclusion. 
■
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SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
Articles
Protecting Property Through Politics: State Legislative Checks and Judicial Takings, 97 Minnesota Law
Review 2176 (2013).
Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership,
111 Columbia Law Review 890 (2011).
The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in
the Fourth Amendment, 95 Cornell Law Review 905
(2010).
Property Frames, 87 Washington University Law Review 449 (2010) (with J. Nash).
Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology
of Home, 107 Michigan Law Review 1093 (2009).
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State Action as Political Voice in Global Climate
Change Policy, in Adjudicating Climate Change:
State, National, and International Approaches (W.
Burns & H. Osofsky eds., Cambridge University
Press 2009).
Reconsidering Crowding Out of Intrinsic Motivation from Financial Incentives: The Case of
Conservation on Private Lands, in 5 Critical Issues
in Environmental Taxation: International and Comparative Perspectives (N. Chalifour et al. eds., Oxford
University Press 2008).

{Juries & Courts}

JURORS &
SOCIAL MEDIA

IS A FAIR TRIAL STILL POSSIBLE?

forthcoming in SMU Law Review, volume 67
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Nancy S. Marder
Professor of Law

BA, Yale College
MPhil, Cambridge University
JD, Yale Law School

N

ancy S. Marder joined the faculty of IIT Chicago-Kent in the fall of 1999. Prior to
beginning her teaching career at the University of Southern California Law School,
Professor Marder was a post-doctoral fellow at Yale Law School (1992–93) and a law
clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens of the U.S. Supreme Court (1990–92). She also clerked
for Judge William A. Norris on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1989–90) and Judge
Leonard B. Sand in the Southern District of New York (1988–1989). In 1987–88, Professor Marder was a litigation associate at the New York law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison.
Professor Marder’s research and writing focus on the jury. She has written about
many aspects of the jury, including peremptory challenges, jury instructions, jurors and
technology, juror questions, jury nullification, post-verdict interviews of jurors, and jury
deliberations. Her articles have appeared in such law reviews as Northwestern University
Law Review, Iowa Law Review, Texas Law Review, Southern California Law Review, and
Yale Law Journal, and she has organized four symposia in the Chicago-Kent Law Review:
“The Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience,” “Secrecy in Litigation,” “The 50th
Anniversary of 12 Angry Men,” and “Comparative Jury Systems.” Professor Marder is the
author of the book The Jury Process (2005), and she has written several book chapters
on the jury and on juries and judges in popular culture. Professor Marder regularly presents
her scholarship at conferences in the United States and abroad.
Professor Marder reaches a wide audience with her work on the jury. She is the
founder and director of the Justice John Paul Stevens Jury Center at Chicago-Kent, which
informs scholars about new work on the jury and also undertakes special projects.
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/nmarder
www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/nmarder.
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Jurors and Social Media
Is a Fair Trial Still Possible?
BY NANCY S. MARDER

S

lowly but surely the constitutional guarantee of
a fair trial is being eroded as social media invades
the jury room. Essential evidentiary rules control
what jurors can learn about a case and what they can
say about it during a trial. In just a decade, the rapid
growth of easy online communication has threatened to
dissolve the protective walls we have built around the
jury. The key question is whether courts can now persuade jurors to resist the siren call of online communication when they serve as jurors. In this Article, I urge
courts to take a “process view” of a juror’s education
and to use every court-juror interaction as an opportunity to teach jurors that they need to avoid using the Internet and social media to communicate about the trial.
When jurors turn to the Internet or social media for
information about the trial they violate key precepts of
a fair trial. The decision-maker is supposed to decide
the case based only on the evidence presented in the
courtroom. One reason is so that the case will be decided based only on information that has met a certain
threshold of reliability. Another reason is so that the

A summary of Nancy S. Marder, Jurors and Social Media: Is a Fair Trial Still Possible?, forthcoming in volume
67 of the Southern Methodist University Law Review (2014) (Criminal Justice Colloquium).
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evidence is further tested through crossexamination, which will reveal its weaknesses. Yet another reason is so that all of
the decision-makers—jurors and judge
alike—work from the same information.
The juror who turns to the Internet or
social media and either intentionally seeks
or is inadvertently exposed to information
pertaining to the trial will no longer rely
just on the evidence presented in the
courtroom. The juror who uses social
media to express his or her views of the
case will no longer appear to be impartial.
Although some jurors in the past might
have violated the judge’s instructions not
to discuss the case with family or friends,
the juror who does so today using social
media reaches a far wider audience and
receives far more media attention than a
juror who spoke to family members in the
past. The juror who turns to social media
today to reveal his or her views calls into
question the fairness of the jury trial.
Although newspaper headlines recount some of the more egregious examples of jurors using social media or the
Internet to obtain information that is
unreliable or inappropriate for them to

“The juror who uses social
media to express his or her
views of the case will no
longer appear to be impartial.”
consider, the scope of the problem is difficult to assess. The few empirical studies
that have been done to date have serious
limitations. One study, conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center, asked participating judges for their perception of how
often jurors used social media when they
were in the courtroom or jury room. Not
surprisingly, few judges observed jurors
using social media in these settings. One
[ 10 ] IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES

problem is that it is difficult for judges to
observe this behavior because they have
many responsibilities in the courtroom.
Another problem is that jurors could use
social media outside of the courtroom
and judges would not observe it. Moreover, asking judges for their perception is
not the same as uncovering actual juror
use of social media. Another study involved two federal district court judges
who asked jurors to complete a survey
after they had served as jurors in their
courtrooms. The survey did not reveal
any instances of jurors’ use of the Internet or social media. In fact, only 6 out of
the 140 jurors who completed the survey
admitted even a temptation to communicate about the trial using social media,
and all six said that they had resisted the
temptation. The authors concluded that
this shows that jurors follow the judge’s
instructions. However, the problem with
this small study is that it asked jurors
while they were still in the courtroom
to admit to the judge who had presided
over the trial that they had disobeyed the
judge’s instructions. Jurors are unlikely to
be forthcoming in those circumstances,
even though they were permitted to complete the survey anonymously.

J

udges feel the need to take action, but
in the face of limited empirical evidence, they have not been sure what to
do. The most common response is to revise the cautionary instruction in an effort
to make it clear to jurors that they need to
refrain from using the Internet and social
media during the trial. A few courts have
gone so far as to ban jurors from having
electronic devices in the courtroom and
deliberation room, but this response does
not address the problem that jurors will
have access to these devices when they go
home at night.
Having jurors refrain from using the

Jurors and Social Media

Internet and social media while they
submit their questions to witnesses; thus,
serve as jurors is likely to grow harder in
they do not need to engage in online selfthe years ahead and will require taking
help to find answers.
what I call a “process view” of a juror’s
The judge can also use the preliminary
education. A process view recognizes
cautionary instructions, final instructions,
that at every stage that the court interacts and admonitions before and after every
with jurors there is an opportunity to edrecess as opportunities to reinforce the
ucate them. From start to finish—from
point that jurors must refrain from conjury summons to jury verdict—there are
ducting their own research on the Interopportunities for
net and can only
the court to edu- “A ‘process view’ of jurors’
share their views
cate jurors about
with their fellow
education
recognizes
that
at
the need to avoid
jurors during deonline communi- every stage that the court
liberations. In fact,
cation about the
one judge in the
interacts
with
jurors
there
is
an
trial.
Northern District
The educaopportunity to educate them.” of Illinois asks
tion of a juror
jurors when they
begins with the jury summons and ends
return from a recess whether they have
when the jury announces its verdict and
refrained from online communication
the judge polls the jury and dismisses it.
during the break. He asks jurors to raise
The jury summons can include a questheir hands to show that they have abided
tion that asks prospective jurors if they
by the court’s instruction. In the public
can adhere to the judge’s instruction and
setting of the courtroom, jurors must take
avoid engaging in online communication
the affirmative step of raising their hands
about the trial. While prospective jurors
and publicly declaring that they have adare in the Jury Assembly Room, waiting
hered to the prohibition. Of course, it is
to be assigned to a courtroom, they usuimportant that the instruction or admoally watch a jury orientation video that
nition is specific and includes an explateaches them about the role of the jury.
nation so that jurors understand exactly
This video can also include a segment on
what they can and cannot do and why. At
the need to avoid online communication
each of these stages in the trial process,
about the trial. Some states, such as Masthe judge should make use of the opporsachusetts, already include such a segtunity to educate jurors about their need
ment in their video. The voir dire, when
to refrain from online communication
prospective jurors are questioned to see if about the trial.
they can serve on a particular jury, provides another opportunity for the judge
process view of a juror’s education
and lawyers to question prospective jurors
will be effective for most, but not all,
and to elicit a public commitment from
jurors. A comprehensive education should
them that they can refrain from commutransform “uninformed jurors” into innicating online about the trial. In some
formed jurors. Uninformed jurors want
states, such as Illinois, jurors have the
to do the right thing but do not know
opportunity to submit written questions
that online communication is prohibited.
to witnesses. Judges in such states can
Once they understand that they cannot
explain to jurors that they will be able to
consult the Internet or social media,

A
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they will abide by the judge’s instruction.
Admittedly, this proposal will not reach
“recalcitrant jurors,” who will remain unmoved by any education. For recalcitrant
jurors, who have no intention of following
the prohibition, the best hope is for lawyers and judges to find new ways to identify and remove them during voir dire. If
they do manage to avoid detection during
voir dire, then it is up to other jurors to
spot them when they violate the prohibition and report them to the judge.
Judges are likely to embrace this proposal because it is flexible and they can
tailor it as they see fit. They might question
whether so much repetition is necessary,
but they can take shortcuts when appropriate. Most important, a process view of a
juror’s education is likely to be effective,
and judges need an effective approach
because it is their responsibility to ensure
that the parties receive a fair trial. This
Article explores what it means to take a
process view of a juror’s education in order to protect the parties’ constitutional
right to a fair trial. 
■
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The Conundrum of Cameras in the Courtroom, 44
Arizona State Law Journal 1489 (2012).
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Century, 81 Notre Dame Law Review 449 (2006).
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Books and Contributions to Books
Jurors and Juries, in Wiley Handbook of Law and Society (forthcoming 2014).
Instructing the Jury, in The Oxford Handbook of
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ACCESS TO JUSTICE &
TECHNOLOGY CLINICS
A 4% SOLUTION

published in Chicago-Kent Law Review, volume 88
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Ronald W. Staudt
Professor of Law

BS/BA, St. Joseph’s College
JD, University of Chicago Law School

R

onald W. Staudt practiced with the firm of Hubacheck, Kelly, Rauch & Kirby for
two years, was staff attorney and assistant director of the Pima County, Arizona,
Legal Aid Society, and was a clinical fellow and lecturer at the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic,
University of Chicago Law School, before joining the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty in 1978.
From 1994 through 1998, on leave from Chicago-Kent, he served as vice president for
technology development and associated positions at LexisNexis Inc. in Dayton, Ohio.
Professor Staudt teaches Copyright Law, Intellectual Property Strategies, Internet
Law, Public Interest Law & Policy, Justice and Technology Practicum, and Access to
Justice and Technology. He is director of the Center for Access to Justice & Technology
(CAJT)—a law school center using Internet resources to improve access to justice with
special emphasis on building Web tools to support legal services advocates, pro bono
volunteers, and pro se litigants.
Professor Staudt has written numerous articles and books on technology and law. His
most recent book is a report co-authored with Charles L. Owen, Distinguished Professor
of Design at IIT’s Institute of Design, and Edward B. Pedwell, titled Access to Justice:
Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants.
Professor Staudt is a fellow, board member, and president of the College of Law Practice Management. He serves on many boards and committees that promote technology
solutions to access to justice problems.
www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/rstaudt
For more, visit his faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/rstaudt.

A

ndrew P. Medeiros is an Associate Legal Solutions Architect with the Legal Technology Innovations Office (LTIO) at Seyfarth Shaw LLP.
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Access to Justice and Technology Clinics
A 4% Solution

BY RONALD W. STAUDT AND ANDREW P. MEDEIROS

T

he Great Recession of 2008 caused widespread
law firm layoffs, falling salaries, and hiring freezes
and may leave a generation of young attorneys
searching for work. The economic crisis included significant reductions in banking, finance, corporate restructuring and real estate transactions and reduced the need
for high‐priced legal services. As large law firm revenues fell, firms protected profits by reducing labor costs.
Large clients demanded discounts and fixed fee
arrangements and sought efficiencies to reduce their
legal spending. As the customers of lawyers demanded
“more for less,” new technologies were introduced and
old technologies revived to increase the effectiveness
and efficiency of law practice. In our view, these new
technologies are not the cause of disruption in legal
markets, but rather the tools that creative lawyers and
legal consultants are using to adapt to the demands of
customers of lawyers at all market levels. These new
efficiencies and new technologies are here to stay. Even
if the gross domestic legal product returns to pre‐2008
levels, the work will be forever changed.

Excerpted from Ronald W. Staudt and Andrew P. Medeiros, Access to Justice and Technology Clinics: A 4%
Solution, 88 Chicago-Kent Law Review 695 (2013) (symposium).
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The ironic twist is that despite an
oversupply of lawyers, we are failing to
meet the legal needs of ordinary people,
especially people with low or modest
incomes. Legal Services Corporation
funded legal aid offices turn away a million eligible prospective clients every year
because they lack the capacity and the
lawyers to serve these legal needs. In addition, millions of modest income people
who are not eligible for legal aid cannot
afford the fees charged by lawyers. The
economic downturn starting in 2008 exacerbated this legal services gap, driving
more modest‐income people into poverty
and more employed people into unemployment and foreclosure. Fully 21% of
the U.S. population is now at or below the
poverty line set by federal standards for
free legal aid to the poor. More than 80%
of the legal needs of low income people
are not met by overstretched legal aid resources.
[ 16 ] IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES

The oversupply of legal talent triggered attacks on law schools from all
angles. Critics charged that law schools
accept too many students, saddle them
with massive amounts of debt, and do not
adequately prepare them for a legal job.
The reduction in job opportunities for law
school graduates and negative publicity
already have cut deeply into the number
of law school applicants. If law schools
maintain admissions standards, fewer
applicants should cause a parallel reduction in the number of law students in the
professional pipeline; the supply of new
lawyers should “right size” to match legal
industry needs.
These new lawyers will need new
skills. The technology changes triggered
by the economic shock have changed the
tools lawyers use to deliver legal services.
New lawyers entering the profession must
be ready to practice in today’s more efficient and more technology-driven workA2J Author® welcome screen.

Access to Justice and Technology Clinics

place. For the most part, law schools are
not currently equipped to teach these new
skills and technologies.

Kent College of Law, has launched its
Access to Justice Clinical Course Project
to develop and refine A2J Clinics. In these
courses, law students build web tools and
his article responds to the criticisms
other interactive content to help low‐inof the quality of legal education, critcome people achieve their justice goals.
icisms that law schools fail to prepare
Courses of this type have been taught
graduates to succeed in the profession.
by several law schools during the past
We propose a modest improvement to
decade. This CALI initiative builds on
the law school curriculum that may make those efforts, organizes faculty across the
graduates more capable to serve their clicountry into a team of collaborators, and
ents. Professor William Henderson of the
establishes a structured process to share
University of Indiana Law School urges
new insights, tools, and curricula with all
a 12% solution, arguing that law schools
law schools.
should begin to introduce competencyLaw school clinics are not the only
based courses at a rate of one course per
feasible home for our proposed courses.
year. We offer here a proposal for one of
Legal writing faculty and traditional
the three new courses, a 4% solution.
podium teachers could also teach these
We propose that law schools add a
courses if they were so inclined. But clinnew type of clinical course that teaches
ical educators are predisposed to focus
law students how to use and deploy techon skills that go beyond legal analysis.
nology to assist law practice. The changes
Clinical educators are also deeply comwe propose will affect about four percent
mitted to access to justice and they, with
of the average law
their students, alschool curriculum. “We propose that law schools ready provide a huge
If widely adopted,
contribution to help
add a new type of clinical
the changes we
meet the legal needs
propose will help
of low income peocourse that teaches law
law students to
ple. Like the clinical
students how to use and
learn core commovement triggered
petencies needed
by CLEPR in the
deploy technology to assist
in an increasingly
1960’s and 1970’s,
law
practice.
The
changes
we
technological prowe think that this
fession, while they propose will affect about four new type of course
build tools and
will fit comfortably
percent
of
the
average
law
write content to
into the clinical
school curriculum.”
help low‐income,
curriculum of many
self‐represented
law schools and that
litigants overcome serious barriers in the
such additions will improve legal educapursuit of justice.
tion and simultaneously reduce barriers
Specifically, we propose that law
to justice for low income people.
schools offer a new clinical experience—
the Access to Justice Technology Clinic,
here is no single, magical software or
or A2J Clinic for short. The Center for
invention that is disrupting settled
Computer‐Assisted Legal Instruction
legal markets and labor practices. Instead,
(CALI®), in partnership with IIT Chicago‐ lawyers in corporate practices and lawyers

T

T
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serving personal legal needs have been
forced to innovate by clients who refused
to pay for outdated and inefficient labor
practices. While legal costs are being
wrung out of the high priced legal market and many young attorneys struggle
to find legal work, we live in an age when
access to affordable legal services is still
impossible for many Americans.
Law schools have a unique opportunity to address the education deficiencies
and the access to justice problem at once.
The law school curriculum must adapt
to produce new lawyers who are fluent
with the technical tools that are becoming
standard in law offices around the country.
The Access to Justice Clinical Course
Project will arm students with document
assembly and automation tools, supply
legal aid organizations with interactive
content to help reduce barriers to justice,
and trigger a reexamination of the core
lawyering competencies that law schools
need to teach. Now is the time for a renewed clinical effort focused on refining our methods of teaching traditional
competencies, developing new models
for teaching transactional approaches to
personal legal services, and teaching the
new competencies needed by the digital
lawyer.■
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Collective Representation

And Employee Voice in the U.S. Public Sector
Workplace: Looking North for Solutions?
BY MARTIN H. MALIN

T

he election in 2010 of conservative Republican legislative majorities and governors in many
states led to a major retrenchment in public employee collective bargaining rights in the United States.
The legislation enacted in these states following the
elections aimed to strengthen unilateral employer control and weaken employee voice. This rebalancing of
power occurred in the context of state public employee
labor relations acts that are largely modeled on the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the federal statute that governs most private sector employers, employees and unions. The NLRA classifies subjects of bargaining as mandatory, permissive and prohibited. Only
subjects classified as mandatory need be bargained. All
others are left to the unilateral control of the party, typically the employer, with the decision-making power.
In the U.S. public sector, courts and labor relations
agencies have defined mandatory subjects of bargaining
much more narrowly than in the private sector. This is
largely due to concerns that many terms and conditions
of employment also raise issues of public policy which,

Excerpted from Martin H. Malin, Collective Representation and Employee Voice in the U.S. Public Sector
Workplace: Looking North for Solutions?, 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 903 (2013).
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the authorities reason, should be resolved right to collective bargaining.
in the public political process rather than
Although most Canadian labor law
at a bargaining table to which only the
statutes are modeled on the NLRA, in
union and emFraser v Ontario
ployer have access. “The difference in approaches (SCC 2011), the
Issues such as
held that the
north and south of the border SCC
class size, school
Charter does not
to collective bargaining and
calendar, teacher
guarantee a right
evaluation, layoffs, freedom of association may be to an NLRA-model
subcontracting,
of collective bartraced to different treatment
drug testing, and
gaining. This Aruse of civilian po- of property rights.”
ticle suggests that
lice review boards
the evolving law
that directly affect employee working
under the Canadian Charter can inspire
conditions have, nevertheless, been held
reform in U.S. public sector labor law.
to not be mandatory subjects because
The NLRA mandates that when a mathey raise questions of public policy more jority of a specifically defined group of an
appropriately left to the political proemployer’s employees select a union as
cess. The result of such a narrow scope
their representative, the union becomes the
of bargaining is to channel unions away
exclusive representative of all employees in
from having a voice on matters that can
that defined group. The employer must neimprove the quality of public services
gotiate in good faith with the union over
and toward bread and butter issues of
mandatory subjects of bargaining and may
wages and benefits and protecting their
not make unilateral changes unless and
members from the effects of decisions
until it has negotiated to impasse. Both
unilaterally imposed by management.
sides may resort to economic weapons—
Unions’ efforts to protect their members
strike or other job action for unions, lockfrom management’s unilateral action may out, replacement of strikers or unilateral
be seen as union obstruction to reform.
change after impasse for employers—to
Unions’ success in the role to which they
pressure the other side in bargaining.
have been relegated has led to backlash,
Many public sector statutes prohibit
further narrowing the scope of bargaining strikes and lockouts and substitute arbiand otherwise reducing worker voice.
tration of disputed issues or non-binding
The U.S. Supreme Court has recfact-finding to resolve impasses.
ognized that public employees’ First
In Fraser, the SCC upheld the Ontario
Amendment right to freedom of associaAgricultural Employees Protection Act
tion includes a right to join a union but,
(AEPA). The AEPA granted agricultural
reasoning that their governmental ememployees rights to form, join and particployer is not constitutionally required to
ipate in employee associations, to assemlisten to their union, has rejected the idea ble, and to make representations, orally or
that freedom of association includes a
in writing, to their employers concerning
right to collective bargaining. In contrast, terms and conditions of employment. It
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has
imposed a duty on employers to listen to
held that the Canadian Charter of Rights
the representations and, when represenand Freedoms’ (Charter) protection of the tations are made in writing, to read them
right to freedom of association include a
and to provide a written acknowledgment
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that it has read them. The SCC interpreted the AEPA as imposing on employers a
duty to consider employee representations
in good faith. So interpreted, the SCC
held that the AEPA was consistent with the
Charter’s right of freedom of association.

T

he difference in approaches north
and south of the border to collective
bargaining and freedom of association
may be traced to different treatment of
property rights. Whereas the Constitution expressly protects property rights,
the Charter omits mention of them and
this omission was deliberate. It reflected
concern that protection of property rights
would invalidate economic regulation and
disturb the recognition that had evolved
in Canada of the primacy of democratic
will over property rights with respect to
such regulation.
In the U.S. private sector, property
rights drive labor law. The limitation
that the duty to bargain extends only to
mandatory subjects recognizes that some
matters, although directly affecting job security or other conditions of employment,
lie at the heart of entrepreneurial control.
Compelling bargaining on these matters
would intrude on employer unilateralism,
that is, on employer control over what it
may do with its property.
The different approaches to property
rights may justify dismissing the evolving
jurisprudence under the Charter when
considering private sector labor law in the
U.S., but the same may not be said with
respect to the U.S. public sector. Public
employers do not have private property
rights. Their premises are public property.
Moreover, the NLRA is premised on,
among other things, a congressional finding of a need to equalize bargaining power between employers and unions, that is,
a need to place limits on otherwise unlimited employer property rights. In contrast,

most public sector labor relations acts are
premised on legislative findings that collective bargaining is in the public interest.
The differences between the public and
private sectors in the U.S. suggest that the
evolving jurisprudence under the Charter
should not be dismissed out of hand in
considering public sector labor law.
The decision in Fraser is ambiguous.
It is not clear what the SCC means when
it speaks of agricultural employers’ duty
to consider employee associations’ representations in good faith. As I read Fraser,
there cannot be good faith consideration
of employee representations without
meaningful discussion with the employees’ association. Furthermore, where
there is an established employee representative, a statutory regime that enables
an employer to act unilaterally without
providing the representative notice and
an opportunity for the making of representations and the conduct of meaningful
discussion effectively renders worker associational activity meaningless.

“We must broaden the range
of subjects on which workers
have a voice, although not
necessarily under a traditional
NLRA model.”
The expansion in the U.S. of increasing employer power channels unions into
doing whatever they can to protect their
members from the consequences of decisions imposed unilaterally by their employers. Over the long term, it is not sustainable as it channels worker voice away
from contributing to the effective delivery of public services. Instead, we must
broaden the range of subjects on which
workers have a voice, although not necessarily under a traditional NLRA model.
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T

he evolving Canadian jurisprudence
mandates avoiding measures that
render worker associational activity
meaningless and employing measures
that provide for meaningful discussion
of worker representations. The presentation of decisions that significantly impact
workers’ workplace lives as fait accompli
renders workers’ associational activities
meaningless. Critical to any reform that
broadens the subjects on which workers
have a voice is a requirement of advance
notice and an opportunity for pre-decisional involvement.
A failure to supply relevant information bears a high risk of rendering
worker associational activity meaningless.
Without adequate information, workers
and their unions are in no position to
make representations to their employers
and it is difficult to see how a good faith
dialogue can occur in an information
vacuum. The exchange of information
facilitates good faith dialogue because it
engenders trust and allows the exploration of mutually beneficial solutions. Any
right to engage in meaningful dialogue
must include a duty to exchange relevant
information.
The right to represent the workers
must remain with their exclusive bargaining representative. By-passing the union
to negotiate directly with individual employees must, as it is under traditional
labor law with respect to mandatory subjects of bargaining, be a per se indicator
of bad faith.
When employees through their unions
make representations to employers, employers must offer their reasons for declining the unions’ proposals. Providing
such reasons facilitates further engagement by inviting the union to refine its
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proposals and can lead to cooperative discussions about mutual and competing interests. “We won’t do it because you can’t
make us,” is not an acceptable response.
The above analysis does not provide
a magic formula for crafting reforms that
expand the scope of workers’ rights to
a voice in workplace decision-making
through alternatives to NLRA-style collective bargaining, but it does provide
a framework for evaluation of specific
reforms. Inspired by the evolving jurisprudence under the Canadian Charter,
we can expand public employee collective voice in ways that are beneficial to
employees, employers and the public atlarge. 
■
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